The treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) are among the most discussed diplomatic documents in modern Kurdish history. What did they actually say, why was one never implemented, and how should we understand their relationship to Kurdish political aspirations? This article compares the primary treaty texts with academic interpretations and distinguishes legal provisions from later historical outcomes.
Introduction: Why these treaties are often compared
The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920, and the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, are frequently invoked in discussions of Kurdish history and the post-First World War Middle East. They were negotiated in different military and diplomatic circumstances, and they did not have the same legal effect. Sèvres proposed far-reaching changes to the territory of the defeated Ottoman Empire and included provisions concerning predominantly Kurdish areas. Lausanne became part of the internationally recognized settlement with the new Turkish state and did not reproduce a plan for Kurdish autonomy or independence.
Understanding these documents requires more than saying that one “promised Kurdistan” and the other “erased Kurdistan.” The precise wording, the conditions attached to the Sèvres provisions, the failure of the earlier settlement to come into force, the Turkish nationalist military victory and the international politics of the period all matter. Contemporary discussions of rights and territorial claims also require careful distinction between the legal texts of the 1920s and political developments that occurred later.
The political situation after the First World War
The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War in 1914 and was defeated in 1918. The armistice did not settle the political future of the empire’s former territories. Allied governments, Turkish nationalist leaders, Ottoman institutions, local elites and competing national movements pursued different projects. Meanwhile, people living in the affected regions faced insecurity, military occupation, food shortages, migration and the consequences of war. The postwar peace conferences produced proposals but not a simple or uncontested map accepted by everyone.
Kurdish political actors did not share one unified strategy. Some leaders favored autonomy or independence; others sought arrangements within a continuing Ottoman or Turkish political framework; local loyalties and relationships with other communities also shaped choices. The historian Djene Rhys Bajalan argues in a 2019 Ethnopolitics article that the geopolitical legacy of the war is essential for interpreting why projects of Kurdish statehood did not succeed. That argument challenges explanations that attribute the outcome to only one cause, such as diplomatic betrayal or internal division.
What was the Treaty of Sèvres?
Sèvres was a peace treaty signed in 1920 between representatives of the Ottoman government and Allied powers. It proposed extensive political, territorial and economic changes and included provisions concerning Armenia, the Straits, minorities and former Ottoman territories. However, the Turkish National Movement rejected the settlement. Because the treaty did not become the operative peace framework for the new Turkish state, its proposed arrangements must be described as unimplemented treaty provisions rather than as institutions that actually came into being.
Readers can consult the full treaty text to check the relevant language. Comparing the wording with summaries is particularly important when discussing territorial proposals. A treaty article may establish a commission or require an additional decision rather than create a country immediately. Treating every proposal as an accomplished fact exaggerates what the negotiators legally specified.
Article 62: A proposed autonomy commission
Article 62 of Sèvres called for a commission composed of representatives appointed by Britain, France and Italy to prepare a scheme of local autonomy for certain predominantly Kurdish areas. The described territory was subject to geographical conditions, including its position east of the Euphrates, south of a boundary proposed for Armenia and north of a frontier involving Syria and Mesopotamia. The article also provided for minority safeguards and an additional process concerning certain frontier questions.
This was a limited and conditional territorial proposal. It did not describe every region where Kurds lived, nor did it establish a single government for Kurdish populations across what are today four states. The language of “predominantly Kurdish areas” had political and administrative implications, but demographic realities and the definition of eligible areas were complex. Article 62 is best understood as the beginning of a proposed autonomy mechanism, dependent on further decisions, not as a decree creating an independent state on the date of signature.
Article 63 and Article 64: Further conditions and a possible independence process
Article 63 addressed the Ottoman government’s acceptance of decisions reached under the proposed commissions. Article 64 provided a possible further path if Kurdish peoples in the defined areas expressed a majority desire for independence within a specified period after the treaty came into force, and if the Council of the League of Nations judged them capable of independence and recommended that result. It then contemplated Turkey’s renunciation of rights and a separate agreement specifying the terms.
The sequence matters: the treaty text described conditions that would need to be satisfied, involving a population request and international political judgment. It was not an automatic promise that an independent Kurdish state would exist immediately. The same article mentioned the possible voluntary adherence of Kurds from the Mosul vilayet under specified circumstances. The relevant text can be examined directly in Articles 62–64. When recounting the document, it is more accurate to say that Sèvres envisaged a conditional process toward possible independence than to claim that Kurdish independence had already been legally realized.
Why Sèvres was not implemented
After 1920, the Turkish National Movement continued military and political efforts against the imposed postwar settlement. The balance of power shifted dramatically during the Turkish War of Independence, including the conflict with Greece. The authority of the Ottoman government that signed Sèvres had also become increasingly disconnected from the emerging nationalist leadership. These circumstances made the treaty politically unsustainable and led to new negotiations rather than implementation of its original provisions.
Historical interpretation involves debate about how much responsibility should be attributed to Allied strategy, Turkish nationalist success, Kurdish political divisions and the structure of international diplomacy. The important factual distinction is clear: the proposed Kurdish autonomy and conditional independence procedures were never carried out under the Sèvres treaty. A historian can discuss why without confusing a signed but unimplemented settlement with an established political institution.
Lausanne in 1923: A new diplomatic settlement
The Treaty of Lausanne was negotiated following the changed military and diplomatic situation and was signed on 24 July 1923. It recognized the new settlement with Turkey and addressed borders, nationality, minority protections and other issues. The treaty replaced the earlier peace framework that Sèvres had proposed for Turkey. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes the Lausanne documents, allowing readers to examine the treaty and associated instruments rather than rely solely on political summaries.
Lausanne contains no equivalent to Sèvres Articles 62–64 establishing a process for Kurdish autonomy or possible independence. That omission is a central reason the two treaties have become enduring points of reference in Kurdish historical debate. Yet Lausanne also did not directly settle every later issue involving Kurdish communities in Iraq, Iran or Syria. The formation and governance of those regions followed multiple additional processes and state histories.
Minority protections: What the Lausanne text actually says
Lausanne’s provisions regarding minority protection are frequently described through the specific rights accorded to non-Muslim minorities. That description is partly correct but not sufficient as a summary of the entire text. Articles 38 and 39 include protections and principles applying more broadly to inhabitants or citizens, while other provisions explicitly mention non-Muslim minorities. Distinguishing between the intended beneficiaries of each clause is essential for a legal reading.
In a 2026 chapter, legal scholar Derya Bayır argues that Articles 38 and 39 granted certain protections relevant to Kurds even though Kurdish communities were not given a special self-rule arrangement. Other legal scholars have proposed different interpretations of minority-related obligations and implementation. Olgun Akbulut’s 2023 article on linguistic minority rights examines the treaty’s drafting and modern application. These are scholarly legal interpretations, not amendments to the historical text. Readers should begin with the treaty’s actual articles and then compare expert readings.
Did Lausanne divide Kurdistan into four states?
A common simplified claim is that Lausanne itself “divided Kurdistan into four countries.” This wording is historically misleading if taken literally. Lausanne was a crucial part of the postwar Turkish settlement, but the international boundaries and institutional arrangements affecting Kurdish communities were shaped through multiple historical processes. Ottoman and Iranian frontiers predated the First World War; the British and French mandates, the creation of Iraq and Syria, and subsequent border negotiations involved additional actors and agreements.
A more precise account is that postwar treaties and state formation consolidated a regional order in which Kurdish communities came to live under several different sovereign states, while Lausanne did not implement the autonomy and independence process contemplated by Sèvres. These distinctions do not deny the political consequences of the settlement. They make it possible to examine them without attributing every historical decision to a single document.
How to interpret promises, rights and political expectations
International negotiations can generate expectations that are not realized. The existence of Articles 62–64 in Sèvres shows that certain Allied and Ottoman treaty negotiators contemplated a form of Kurdish autonomy and possible further independence, subject to conditions. It does not prove that all Kurdish political leaders endorsed the same proposal, that every Kurdish-speaking area was included, or that implementation would have been straightforward. Conversely, the failure of the scheme does not mean that Kurdish national or cultural aspirations disappeared after 1923.
Historical scholarship offers several interpretations of these events. Some emphasize a missed opportunity for self-determination; others stress the impracticality and conditional nature of the proposed settlement or the changing balance of power. A peer-reviewed study in Nationalities Papers discusses Kurdish statelessness and the legacy of Sèvres. Bajalan’s study explores the postwar geopolitical context. Comparing multiple arguments helps readers separate their own political evaluation from the narrower historical question of what the agreements actually stipulated.
What changed—and what did not—in Kurdish life
The treaties belong to diplomatic history, but their significance extends into the social history of language, education, property, migration and political organizing. Kurdish communities experienced different state policies in the decades that followed, and those experiences differed widely between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Literary organizations, schools, regional leaders and diaspora networks took shape under distinct legal and political conditions. The absence of a Kurdish independence provision at Lausanne did not determine every later development by itself.
For educators and students, the best approach is to keep the treaties connected to the larger social history without using them as explanations for every later event. A lesson on Lausanne should not substitute for the study of Kurdish newspapers, cultural movements, regional autonomy in Iraq, or language policies in different countries. Diplomatic documents reveal what negotiators agreed to or proposed; they do not contain the full experiences of the communities whose futures were affected.
Frequently asked questions
Did Sèvres establish an independent Kurdistan? No. It provided a conditional process for a scheme of autonomy and possible future independence in specified areas, but that process was never implemented.
Did Lausanne create Kurdish autonomy? No. It did not reproduce Sèvres’ provisions for Kurdish self-government or conditional independence.
Did the two treaties cover every Kurdish-speaking region? No. The Sèvres Kurdish clauses specified a limited proposed area. Other regions and later political arrangements followed different histories.
Should readers interpret the provisions of Lausanne without a lawyer? The treaty text can be read by anyone, but contemporary legal claims should be compared with qualified scholarship and the relevant legal history.
Primary documents and academic bibliography
- Treaty of Sèvres (1920), full text, especially Articles 62–64 — historical primary source.
- Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne (1923) — official diplomatic documents.
- Lausanne Peace Treaty, Part I: Political Clauses — primary source, including minority protection articles.
- Djene Rhys Bajalan (2019), “The First World War, the End of the Ottoman Empire, and Question of Kurdish Statehood: A ‘Missed’ Opportunity?” Ethnopolitics.
- “Kurdistan on the Sèvres Centenary,” Nationalities Papers (2022).
- Derya Bayır (2026), “Beyond the Reach of the League? The Minority Clauses of the Lausanne Treaty and the Status of the Kurds”.
- Olgun Akbulut (2023), “Re-Interpretation and Re-Implementation of Linguistic Minority Rights of Lausanne”.
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